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 Frame Envy in Energy Policy Ideology: 
A Social Constructivist Framework for Wicked Energy Problems 
1.0 Introduction 
A picture, it has been said, is worth a thousand words. Yet, ask 1000 people to summarize in words                   
what a painting means to them and we will find ourselves confronted with 1000 distinctly different                
descriptions. Ontologically, to post-empiricists, analysis of energy policy - indeed analysis of any public              
policy challenge - shares an allegorical similarity with art appreciation. The art aficionado possesses an               
individualized worldview through which a work of art is judged. Similarly, the artist who has fashioned a                 
work possesses an individualized worldview which he or she attempts to communicate to others. When               
the worldviews of the aficionado and the artist converge, a connection is made and a sense of                 
appreciation arises in the viewer. When the worldviews clash, disconnect and perhaps even discontent              
occurs. In other words, beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder, only because the vista that the beholder                   
is viewing conflates with that person’s perspective on beauty. The same can be said about energy policy                 
analysis: two energy experts can be presented with the same data and derive opposing conclusions               
regarding how to contend with a given energy issue. 
The inspiration for this article lies in a recent exchange concerning frames, ideology, and              
constructivism in energy policy research and interpretation. This basic premise - competing worldviews             
underpin clashing perspectives in energy policy analysis - provides the foundation of a work by Sovacool                
and Brown (2015). Sovacool and Brown (2015) argued that “assumptions and values can play a               
combative, corrosive role in the generation of objective energy analysis.” In order to illustrate the types                
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of conflicts that can occur, the authors introduced eight competing energy “frames”, which they              
contended represent dominant ideologies through which groups of people contest key energy issues.             
These illustrative frames were generated through an analysis of 15 conflicting energy issues as described               
in a broader monograph with Johns Hopkins University press (Sovacool et al., 2016). Both the book and                 
the paper propose that conflicts could be attenuated by adopting six maxims that interested              
stakeholders could employ as a guide to better understand the drivers that underpin one’s own               
perspectives on energy and the perspectives of others. Indeed, Sovacool et al. (2016) demonstrate how               
these maxims can be employed by analyzing competing perspectives on 15 essential energy questions. 
In response to Sovacool and Brown’s article, Felder offered a critique which concluded that              
Sovacool and Brown’s paper makes “expansive claims that become less clear, less grounded and less               
helpful to its goal of reducing contentiousness through building common ground and improving             
analysis” (Felder, 2016, p. 712). In the conclusion to the critique, Felder took particular exception to the                 
authors’ introduction of ideological frames to illustrate how competing worldviews sire contention.            
Felder argued that frames are difficult to comprehensively catalogue and not necessarily the basis upon               
which energy decision makers carry out energy analyses. In turning to policy implications, Felder              
suggested that the main objective of the energy analyst should be to strive for empirically rational                
investigations and that analyses of competing values left to “philosophers in terms of substance and to                
political scientists in terms of process and governance” (Felder, 2016, p. 715).  
In reading through Felder’s critique, it became apparent to us that a response that extended               
beyond a simple communique was necessary to help avoid future misinterpretation of post-empiricist             
research by more carefully describing the sociological roots which underpin the analytical perspectives             
put forward by Sovacool, Brown and Valentine (herein referred to as the SBV social constructivist               
framework). More is at stake here than a mere disagreement between two studies, or disciplinary               
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perspectives. Although the ensuing discussion does center on the literatures of Sovacool and Brown              
(2015), Sovacool et al. (2016), and Felder (2016), it cuts to the core about how energy problems are                  
defined, interpreted, communicated, planned for, and potentially implemented via policy. Put another            
way, our study offers a timely critique or a call for reconceptualizing the process and practice of energy                  
policy itself.  
To make this case, our argument will be presented in the following manner. Section 2 will 
expand on the theoretical foundations underpinning the SBV social constructivist framework. Section 3 
will then draw from this foundation to demonstrate how Felder’s critique (and others like it) not only 
misses the mark, but also validates our perspective. Section 4 focuses policy implications, and section 5 
summarizes why the SBV social constructivist framework is valuable for seeking compromise in the face 
of wicked energy problems, that is problems, often intractable, that span across many agencies, 
organizations, and public members but also lack easily identified solutions (Weber and Khademian 
2008).  
 2.0 Positivism, Post-empiricism and Public Policy 
Harold Laswell, who is considered to be one of the founders of public policy, envisaged a field                 
which was “multidisciplinary and contextual in nature” (Torgerson, 1985), and as such, necessitated             
contributions from political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, statistics, mathematics and          
even in some cases the physical and natural sciences (Fischer, 2003). Policy analysis, which is a sub-field                 
of public policy and represents the core theme of contention around which this article is based, has                 
been defined by Dunn through a similar conceptual lens as “an applied social science discipline which                
uses multiple methods of inquiry and arguments to produce and transform policy-relevant information             
that may be utilized in political settings to resolve policy problems” (Dunn, 1981, p. 35). One of the key                   
reasons cited for advocating multiple methods of enquiry were the limitations of individuals to              
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comprehensively understand and respond to complex problems. Herbert Simon referred to these            
limitations as “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1982). In Simon’s view, the impact of bounded rationality              
on the policymaking process was that it encouraged policymakers to prioritize. He called the quest to                
simply get the job done, ​satisficing ​(Simon, 1982). In many respects, this was understandable because in                
the 1950s, the process of rebuilding from the Second World War consumed policymakers in most               
western nations. Economies were booming and policymakers were struggling to keep up with an              
unprecedented expansion of social services. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, policy scholars circled back to two policy themes. The first theme,                
catalyzed by the social movements of the time, arose in response to a need to quantify the ​effectiveness                  
of a given policy. It was fine that policymakers were responding to emergent problems (satisficing) but,                
were these responses having the desired effect and improving aggregate societal welfare? The second              
avenue of enquiry, largely driven by concerns over financial austerity – stemming from the oil crises of                 
the 1970s and corresponding economic downturns – highlighted the need to evaluate the ​cost              
effectiveness of a given policy initiative. In other words, efficiency became an important feature of policy                
analysis. 
A group of scholars who advocated a competing positivist epistemological approach to policy             
analysis served as the vanguard for the efficiency movement. One quest of this group was to seek a                  
method of empirical-scientific inquiry that could help attenuate institutional paralysis in the face of              
value-laden stakeholder disputes over desirable policy directions. The goal as Bernstein (1978) described             
it was to employ scientific principles to “downplay the subjective foundations of social understanding”              
(Fischer, 2003).  
Economics became ensconced as the vanguard field within the positivist movement. Promoted            
as a pseudoscience by its advocates, theorists in this field began to turn their sights on developing                 
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methodologies to quantify what they call externalities - direct and indirect costs and benefits that a free                 
market does not automatically internalize into the price of a product or service (Thampapillai, 2002). It                
was and still is the belief of many environmental economists that complete quantification of              
externalities represents the holy grail in terms of developing analyses which yield socially optimal              
solutions (Tietenberg, 2003). The seemingly obvious objection is that the calculation of externalities             
requires value judgments, thereby thrusting subjectivity into an otherwise objective analysis. As Frank             
Fisher notes in a critique of this position, “perhaps the main problem with modern-day neo-positivism,               
like its predecessors, is that it still deceptively offers an appearance of truth. It does so by assigning                  
numbers to decision-making criteria and produces what can appear to be definitive answers to political               
questions” (Fischer, 2003). 
This significant concern has not deterred politicians and policymakers from embracing economic            
theory as a dominant lens through which to analyze public problems. With good reason - economic                
theory has played an influential role in guiding economic development to higher levels of affluence, as                
seen through the metric of gross domestic product (Frank and Bernanke, 2007; Maddison, 2003). Yet as                
the human global population increases and resource consumption begins to diminish environmental            
carrying capacity (Valentine, 2010a), even experts indoctrinated initially into supporting the benefits of             
neo-classical economic theory began to realize that growth can be problematic in a world of finite                
resources and environmental sinks (Costanza et al., 1997; Daly, 1990; Stiglitz, 2002). These concerns              
have led some policy scholars back to the roots of policy analysis - roots that were firmly couched in                   
sociological theory (Rochlin, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014). For some scholars returning to this conceptual               
homestead, one question stands out: Does a strategy exist which allows us to analyze social and                
environmental problems in a manner that does not devolve into a contest of competing values? 
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 To answer this question, the notion of constructivism is essential. Constructivism posits that             
human beings “construct” understanding through a recursive process that involves comparing           
experiences (including interactions with others) with existing beliefs (Piaget, 1951). Social constructivism            
represents a subfield wherein scholars believe that worldviews are largely constructed through            
interactions with others. Under the social constructivist paradigm, the process of confirmation or             
disconfirmation of worldviews emerges as central to learning and sense making (Jonassen, 1999).             
Individuals acquire information or experiential knowledge through interactive cues (peer groups,           
schools, books, media etc.) and then over time, the aggregate body of cues serve to confirm or                 
disconfirm understanding (Tam, 2000). This thus distinguishes constructivism or constructivist          
approaches from others summarized in Table 1 such as positivism, critical realism, and relativism (Geels               
et al. 2016). 
Table 1: Social constructivism compared to positivism, critical realism, and relativism 
 Positivism Post-positivism Relativism Constructivism 
Assumptions 
about the 
nature of 
reality 
Reality is 
independent and 
objective (that 
is, empirical and 
measurable). 
Reality is independent 
and layered, consisting of 
surface level ‘events’, 
mediating mechanisms, 
and generative 
structures. 
There is no single reality, 
but multiple stories and 
narratives of different 
realities. 
Reality is socially 
constructed through 
intersubjective 
meanings. 
Explanatory 
goal and style 
Deterministic: 
uncover general 
laws and 
relations 
between 
variables (and 
represent these 
mathematically). 
Interpretive: explain 
processes by analysing 
actions in the context of 
structures, mediated by 
causal mechanisms. 
Critical: uncover hidden 
interests and power 
structures, emancipate 
the silenced voices, raise 
normative questions (on 
justice, equity and 
fairness). 
Interpretive: describe 
evolving meanings to 
understand reality 
construction. 
Methodology Experiment, 
model 
simulations, 
manipulation of 
variables and 
quantitative data. 
Trace processes and 
event chains (quantitative 
or qualitative) and 
attempt to infer causal 
mechanisms and deeper 
structures. 
Reveal contradictions and 
paradoxes, show 
multiplicity and 
alternatives, opening up 
debates. 
‘Follow the actors’ in 
real-life contexts, 
describe interpretations, 
disagreements and 
(emerging) consensus. 
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Typical 
disciplines 
Mainstream 
economics, 
system analysis 
and operations 
sciences. 
Structuration theory 
and neo- 
institutional theory. 
Critical theory, 
post-structural sociology, 
critical management 
studies, critical discourse 
theory and cultural 
studies. 
Interpretive sociology, 
phenomenology and social 
psychology. 
View on 
governance 
Policymakers 
‘outside’ the 
system, pulling 
‘levers’ to steer 
developments. 
Policymakers are part of 
the system and 
dependent on other 
actors. They can try to 
‘modulate’ ongoing 
dynamics, but not steer at 
will. 
Policymakers align with 
societal elites to protect 
vested interests. 
Deliberative governance, 
based on consultation and 
participatory debate. 
Governance as 
open-ended learning 
process, based on 
experiments, projects and 
sense-making. 
Source: Modified from Geels et al. (2016). 
 
It should be intuitively apparent from a social constructivist perspective that if individuals             
construct worldviews based on individual experiences and exposure to the perspective of others, no one               
can be expected to share the exact same worldview across all contexts. In other words, people differ in                  
their constructs of how the world works and these differences give rise to unique value sets and                 
ideologies that can at times clash.  
This relativity in perceptions is not necessarily a negative thing. In social constructivist theory,              
the clash between worldviews is central to learning (Bates and Sangra, 2011). Learning ensues when a                
competing worldview is put forth which challenges the learner’s current worldview to a sufficient extent               
that they are encouraged to repudiate previous beliefs. If such a challenge is not successful, the person’s                 
original worldview remains intact and learning does not occur. 
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Constructivist theory feeds into the SBV framework in three important ways. First, the SBV              
strategy embraces the perspective that different worldviews exist because everyone is exposed to             
different social influences and environments. SBV offer eight worldviews that they called “frames” in              
order to try and illustrate why conflict arises in regard to energy policy analysis (Sovacool et al., 2016;                  
Sovacool and Brown, 2015). However, as Sovacool and Brown pointed out in their article, these are just                 
illustrative frames. Many more exist and, we would contend and expound upon later, it is not necessary                 
to fully document these frames as Felder suggests (Felder, 2016, p. 712).  
This leads on to the second connection to constructivist theory, the SBV framework posits that it                
is necessary to encourage dialogue between people who hold different worldviews in order to either               
facilitate consensus through learning or, failing that, to enhance understanding of the premises and              
values upon which people hold conflicting views. This latter goal can, in practice, aid in facilitating                
compromise between competing groups or in the case of SBV’s 15 contentious questions, sire              
synthesized solutions that conflicting parties might be able to agree on. The German philosopher Hegel               
referred to this as progressing from thesis and antithesis to synthesis.  
Third, and critically, the SBV approach takes a more holistic view of what constitutes a “frame”                
itself. We contend that frames are far more than simply “rhetoric” or an “approach”, as Felder supposes.                 
Without reflexivity, frames can become so embedded that they become inseparable from personal             
identity and can permeate well beyond the policymaking sphere (Wong, 2012). The tendency for frames               
to cut across analytical and policy dimensions has been extensively documented throughout the social              
sciences, with numerous examples from the energy and climate sphere as well. Indeed, even from the                
fringes of Felder’s own field of economics, Amos Tversky and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman achieved               
global recognition for their work demonstrating how one’s framing of issues influenced choice and              
decision outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In short, frames matter as a basis for discourse. 
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One need only peruse Pelling (2010) to see the salience of such frames when understanding               
views of climate vulnerability and cities, or Obeng-Odoom’s (2015) analysis of the different frames for               
viewing oil and gas development in West Africa, or Hess et al.’s (2016) explication of competing frames                 
in regard to renewable energy and energy efficiency. Indeed, we agree with Smith et al. (2016), who                 
argue that frames within public and media discourses are a key driver of enhanced complexity within                
complex adaptive systems - the frames themselves influence data collection, knowledge, and            
policymaking in a mutually constitutive, cyclical relationship. To paraphrase these works: it is all but               
impossible to determine where an analytical frame ends, and a political or planning frame begins. What                
makes such frames even more difficult to identify is that often they exist subconsciously or               
surreptitiously – agents influenced by a particular frame may not even be aware that they are                
encumbered by such fetters, even when such a frame is founded in ignorance, or is “wrong” (Rayner,                 
2012; Stoknes, 2014). 
One could say that most early positivists would accept the notion of multiple realities as put                
forth by social constructivists; however, they would also contend that scientific analyses of these              
competing realities can yield a preferred alternative that optimizes impact provided that the goals and               
criteria upon which optimization is judged are clearly established. Positivists contend that through             
scientific analysis even vexing social problems can be rectified through interventions that are both              
effective and efficient (Ritzer and Goodman, 2003). To economic positivists choosing an energy system              
for a given nation simply requires a process of quantifying all of the benefits and costs associated with                  
each viable technological alternative. The alternative with the highest net benefit then becomes the              
preferred solution. This worldview is epitomized by the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as illustrated by              
Felder in the context of energy efficiency analysis (Felder, 2016). 
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On the surface, the logic put forth by economic positivists possesses intuitive appeal. For              
example, consider a simple investment decision. Imagine that you are the CEO of a company that runs                 
coal-fired power plants. You have US$2 billion to invest in a 1,600 MW plant. There are two prospective                  
sites where this plant can be built and they are within 500 m of each other. Clearly, under such a highly                     
simplified scenario – ​ceteris paribus (“with all other things being equal” is key terminology in the                
assumption-laden world of the economist) – one would likely choose the site that offers the lowest                
costs. Yet the straw-person that positivist economists create in proposing such a scenario begins to lose                
its stuffing as assumptions are relaxed and dissimilar alternatives are compared, requiring contentious             
assumptions about such issues as the value of human life, the impact of employment that has been                 
displaced and subjective notions of technological risk (Stern et al., 2016). In short, it is simply not                 
possible to carry out a CBA for most energy initiatives without making distinct value judgments at some                 
juncture. As Ackerman and Heinzerling muse, we are left “knowing the price of everything and the value                 
of nothing”(Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2005).  
Subjective assessment of critical variables renders the positivist goal of a single quantifiable             
truth to be unachievable. While positivist economists might be attracted to the notion that they can                
scientifically reduce everything to a quantifiable pool of costs and benefits which can then be compared,                
the reality is that such economists must inevitably make judgments based on value propositions that are                
inherently subjective (Valentine, 2014). In other words, economic positivism is just another “frame”             
through which we can categorize decisions underpinned by similar (though not necessarily identical)             
worldviews. 
Felder’s critique is illustrative of a positivist mindset that fuels dialogues of the deaf when it                
comes to analyzing many energy issues (Scholten and Van Nispen, 2008; Valentine, 2010b). In the false                
hope that there must be a rational system upon which to quantify analysis of a given energy problem,                  
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economic positivists fail to recognize that they themselves are living testament to the legitimacy of               
social constructivist ideology. To demonstrate why this is so, the next section explores the logic               
underpinning Felder’s critique and his conclusions stemming from his energy efficiency case study. 
3.0 The Subjective, Value-Laden Elements of “Objective” Cost-Benefit Analyses 
In his critique of the SBV social constructivist framework – an exercise that he refers to as                 
“postmodern mush” – Felder presents a “case study” of energy efficiency analyses to clarify his points.                
In his illustration, Felder asserts that there are five standard energy efficiency cost-benefit analyses              
(CBA) used by various states to analyze energy initiatives (Felder, 2016, p. 713-14). He argues that                
disputes over which of these competing CBAs is most appropriate primarily center on assumptions made               
in defining “terms” which set the criteria for guiding the analysis and on contention stemming from                
“empirical and methodological differences” (Felder, 2016, p. 714). Felder seems oblivious to the fact              
that “empirical and methodological differences” arise due to subjective decisions over which metric for              
analysis is most objective. To Felder, the cost-benefit analysis is a tool of objective merit that is derived                  
from empirically informed judgement and as such, should be the prime basis for analyses feeding into                
the policymaking process. 
Throughout his critique, Felder seems largely unaware of the fact that his examples, rather than               
contesting SBV’s “postmodern mush”, actually serve to reinforce the SBV social constructivist            
framework. As will be outlined in this section, CBAs depend inherently on assumptions that are largely                
based on ideological perspectives. One might be more optimistic than another regarding future energy              
costs. Another might be more conservative when estimating the cost of externalities. Optimism and              
conservatism are ideologically based constructs. In other words, whether he chooses to acknowledge             
this or not, Felder and his CBA advocates are guided by postmodern mush at many steps along the CBA                   
path. 
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Indeed, Felder’s failure to recognize the role of ideology in his advocacy of CBAs serves to                
highlight the importance of one of the six maxims that we recommend to help improve understanding                
when it comes to making energy policy decisions – the need for reflexivity. His inability to appreciate                 
that many assumptions that go into CBA design are underpinned by ideological choices, typify oversights               
that have prompted our advocacy for increased self-reflection regarding the ideologies that guide             
sense-making. Digging deeper into his analysis of how CBA is used to evaluate energy efficiency helps to                 
shed light on the contradictions that are inherent in his logic and that are easily explained within a social                   
constructivist paradigm. 
Felder unwittingly fortifies one of our key points when describing why energy analysts employ              
different CBA’s. He argues that the CBA is “an analytical frame that applies a discipline to answer                 
descriptive and normative questions” (Felder, 2016, p. 714). He contends that disagreements over             
conclusions of competing CBAs are often due to the deviation of actual versus expected energy market                
trends. As he puts it, “general trends in the energy sector map explain the ​energy efficiency gap​” – a                   
term that he uses to refer to “wide disagreement between analysts regarding the cost-effectiveness of               
energy efficiency programs” (Felder, 2016, p. 714). In other words, Felder appears to be arguing that the                 
accuracy of CBAs varies because, due to uncertainty, assumptions that go into the construct of some                
models wind up being more accurate than assumptions that go into the construct of other models.  
We would contend that in making this statement, Felder is validating one of our key points –                 
amidst uncertainty decisions are made which rely on assumptions that are underpinned by worldviews.              
For example, forward-looking CBAs are challenged by a confounding level of subjective judgment             
because they must project future prices for energy technologies. Two CBAs looking at coal-fired power               
plant might come to vastly different conclusions about their viability depending on the assumed future               
price of coal that is being used in the analysis. Predicting fossil fuel prices is not an exact science; if it                     
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were, there would be no futures markets for coal, oil, or natural gas. Consequently, any CBA that                 
incorporates estimates of energy costs must be based on subjective evaluations.  
Indeed, at many stages, CBA’s must incorporate assumptions that depend on value-laden            
propositions, such as the value of premature deaths discussed earlier. Another example concerns             
climate change impact projections which should factor into most energy efficiency CBA’s given the              
contribution that fossil fuel energy production makes to climate change. Ideally, in nations where energy               
is provided by greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting sources, when preparing energy efficiency CBA’s, analysts              
should estimate a carbon cost to permit economic internalization of the GHG emissions that were offset                
by the energy efficiency initiative under scrutiny. However, economic estimates of GHG offsets are              
largely dependent on the perspective that an analyst possesses in regard to risk, because climate science                
is far from exact. Compared to a risk-tolerant analyst, a risk-averse analyst following the precautionary               
principle (a value-laden principle) might factor in a far higher carbon cost to fully account for                
uncertainties of climate change impact projections.  
Felder is welcome to perceive such decisions as being empirically grounded but it is illogical to                
assume that value judgments do not play a role in any empirical assessment. To be fair, in his                  
conclusion, Felder notes that ideological frames are not easily defined. He acknowledges that the              
delineation of CBA into five standard approaches could be interpreted as either five analyses within a                
single CBA frame or five independent frames. However, we contend that even delineating CBA              
approaches as constituting five ideological frames represents a flawed understanding of what an             
ideological frame is. It is a broad misunderstanding of constructivist principles to erroneously assign an               
ideological perspective to an object such as a CBA. Ideological perspectives are worldviews that people               
bring into an analysis. Things (like CBAs) do not possess ideological leanings, only people do. Employing                
our social constructivist framework, we would contend that people who undertake analysis using any of               
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the standard five CBAs would all possess different worldviews and if there were sufficient commonality               
in regard to worldviews shared by clusters of people, we could then empirically investigate the impact                
that this common world view has on the CBA process.  
As is the case with most positivist scholars, Felder appears to be searching for a definitive                
roadmap to help conclusively identify one best approach to energy analysis. In his critique, he make                
statements such as “the S&B analysis could benefit from a more detailed articulation of the categories of                 
the types of disputes that do occur in research literature”, “the S&B frames are a mix of political and                   
social ideologies intertwined with academic disciplines and issue politics, which should be            
sub-categorized into these three areas”, and “it is a challenge for social science to establish a clear and                  
distinct taxonomy that is applicable to all situations, and one could continue with such a detailed                
analysis of S&B’s eight energy frames, which would help flush out and arrive at the root causes of the                   
disagreements that arise out of employing different frames”. All of these statements seem to suggest a                
desire to construct a comprehensive list of ideological frames so that positivists, such as Felder, can then                 
decide which ideological mindset is most rational given the context of a given CBA challenge.  
These types of statements highlight severe shortcomings when it comes to understanding            
post-empirical analysis. Identifying people as being “technological optimists” or “environmental          
preservationists” represent artificial constructs that social constructivists create to highlight elements of            
ontological difference that cause groups to possess conflicting worldviews. These are not prescriptive             
terms which necessarily define individuals. A person is not a technological optimist for life. A person                
possesses influential views of how technology relates to a given policy issue that “frame” their decision                
processes. This is why social constructivists create the artificial construct “technological optimists” to             
define an ontological mindset that is characterized by a belief that suitable technology will come along                
to solve a problem.  
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The notion of how a person frames an issue does not preclude a person from possessing other                 
mindsets as well, or from their frame changing over time. For example, a person can possess traits that                  
one might attribute to both technological optimists and environmental preservationists. A person            
possessing such a mindset might view environmental governance as an area that can be significantly               
enhanced through technology. A person may also change their frames based on experiences such as               
having children, learning a new skill, or refining their education and knowledge.  
In such discussions, social constructivists might label a person to be a technological optimist or a                
positivist, for that matter, but it would be a mistake to interpret this in its literal sense. What social                   
constructivists mean when they call someone a positivist is that the person possesses a worldview(s) on                
a particular issue (or issues) that tends to be heavily influenced by a desire to analyze something based                  
on objective, empirically verifiable metrics. Individually, the influence of deeply held frames changes             
across contexts and evolve over time. This is encouraging as it implies that there is indeed hope that                  
positivists will, through reflexivity, eventually become post-positivists. 
Moreover, social constructivists challenge the notion that identifying an exhaustive list of            
ontological taxonomies would be possible or even desirable. The best we can hope for is to identify                 
common ontological influences that help us to understand why people disagree. To this aim, the goal of                 
the SBV perspective in regard to energy analysis is to begin to identify and understand the impact of                  
competing ideologies when it comes to human decision-making processes related to energy. What             
Felder calls “postmodern mush” is something that social scientists consider to be ideological mosaics              
that are real and have meaningful impact on energy decision-making, whether Felder and his colleagues               
choose to acknowledge this or not. 
Some of Felder’s critique comes down to confusion over semantics. Felder makes the point that               
one explanation of divergent evaluations in energy can arise due to “clarification of terms” such as the                 
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boundaries of an analysis, discount rates, and relevant costs, etc. (Felder, 2016, p. 714). Felder appears                
to be arguing that if one were more specific regarding what one meant by terms such as ​cost-effective​,                  
efficient​, and ​benefit (Felder, 2016, p. 714), differences between CBAs would vanish. This is only a partial                 
truth. As we argue in our first of the six maxims (Sovacool et al., 2016), keeping up-to-date on trends in                    
energy resources and technology and clarifying assumptions that go into the compilation of data              
analysis is valuable for helping people to understand the numbers presented in CBAs. However, as we                
illustrated earlier with our example of how projections over carbon cost and energy prices can differ                
based on ideological leanings, we would contend that clarifying terms will not, by itself, unify               
cost-benefit analyses.  
4.0 Frames, Facts, and Implications for Policy  
Despite these major disagreements with Felder’s analysis, we would agree with some of his              
conclusions, while also arguing that our analysis is far more nuanced than Felder’s critique suggests.               
First, he points out that “the notion of a frame may not be easy to pin down, particularly over time”                    
(Felder, 2016, p. 715). We agree with this statement. However, we also believe that there are some                 
dominant ideologies that appear to drive competing perspectives to many contentious energy issues. In              
our book, we argue that a discourse designed to share information, explicate competing values and seek                
compromise solutions can in the best of circumstances generate consensus or at least identify a               
synthesized perspective that competing parties can support (albeit reluctantly) in a manner which is as               
inclusive as possible. 
Felder also argues that “just because a group of analysts are arguing within a frame does not                 
mean that they necessarily accept that frame”. This too is something we would agree with. Indeed, our                 
maxim of reflexivity suggests that awareness of one’s own ideological catalysts is possible and that               
self-knowledge can be useful in seeking compromise between parties who hold competing perspectives.             
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We are also willing to accept Felder’s point that self-awareness can also be used strategically to achieve                 
ulterior goals; but this does not detract from our position, it merely complicates the challenge of                
analysis. 
Felder further makes a point that “there are other considerations beside the selection of              
frames” (Felder, 2016, p. 715). Aside from questioning whether people can always consciously choose              
frames for analyzing a particular problem, we would agree with the sentiment that values are not the                 
only criteria that influence perspectives on energy issues. This would have been apparent if Felder had                
closely read the book from which the Sovacool and Brown article was extracted from. Table 2 lists six                  
causes of contention that we have identified as being salient to disputation in energy deliberations               
(Sovacool et al., 2016). However, one would be hard-pressed to successfully argue that values do not                
play a role in any of the six causes. 
Table 2: Six Causes of Contention in Energy Deliberations  
Cause of 
contention 
Explanation Academic disciplines supporting 
this claim 
Competing 
interests 
Energy is big business and no one wants to lose when the 
loss amounts to one’s livelihood. 
Political economy, political 
ecology, geography  
Complexity and 
change 
Stakeholders base their support on data and technology 
projections that are contentious and change rapidly. 
Engineering, industrial 
processes, innovation studies, 
energy policy 
Risk and 
uncertainty 
Differing interpretations of hazards and their implications 
can convince people to make poor decisions 
Risk management, project 
management, social psychology 
Undemocratic 
exclusion  
Energy systems can exclude or marginalize people from 
the decision-making or licensing process 
Social justice, contemporary 
ethics, legal studies  
Values and 
ideology 
Distinct systems of values and beliefs can lead to 
competition over what should be prioritized. 
Political science, sociology, 
anthropology, cultural studies  
Energy 
evangelism 
Energy is such a heated topic that the outcome can 
become a matter of religious or political faith - 
downgrading or ignoring opposing information. 
Sociology of expectation, group 
psychology, communication 
studies 
Source: (Sovacool et al., 2016) 
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To illustrate, consider how complexity and change lead to differences of perspective. In             
explicating this cause in Table 2 we state, “Stakeholders base their support on data and technology                
projections that are contentious and change rapidly”. One implication here is that some people simply               
do not possess up to date information. Although one might be tempted to argue that lack of up to date                    
information is not related to worldviews, deeper introspection invalidates this argument. People may             
lack current, sufficient scientific knowledge due to conscious choices they make concerning media             
exposure, openness to new information, and even social groups that they interact with. These influences               
are all impacted by subconscious choices that people make in the everyday course of their lives –                 
choices that are guided in part by ideological influences.  
As our sixth maxim further suggests, there is a high degree of technological entrenchment when               
it comes to decision-making in the energy sector and commitment to certain technologies blinds              
decision-makers when it comes to evaluating alternative technologies. Staunch advocacy of nuclear            
power in seismically active Japan (Sovacool and Valentine, 2012) and Malaysian support for ecologically              
invasive, large scale hydropower in rural Sarawak (Sovacool and Valentine, 2011) exemplify how path              
dependency takes on a life of its own. This illustrates that special interests and ideologies shape our                 
interpretation of even the most uncontentious of facts. 
Felder further suggests “although the S&B analysis and proposed maxims are directed at             
producers of energy analysis and research, perhaps it should be expanded to include reviewers and               
users of such efforts” (Felder, 2016, p. 715). Not only do we agree with the suggestion put forth, we                   
would point out that at the beginning of the paper, we made it clear that the terms ​decision-makers and                   
analysts refer to not only “the more traditional notion of policymakers and regulators but also ordinary                
students, jurists, homeowners, business persons, investors and consumers” (Sovacool and Brown, 2015,            
p. 38). Our perspective is that energy planning should be an inclusive process (our second maxim) and                 
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that all people have a stake in this issue. Therefore, all people are subject to the same ideological forces                   
that alter perception and frame support for certain energy outcomes. 
Felder puts forth an additional recommendation that “policymakers and analysts should reject            
the notion that analysts are inexorably bound to their analytical frames” (Felder, 2016, p. 715). We                
would agree partially with this contention, albeit for different reasons. Felder advocates this in the               
context that energy policy is about more than just competing values, it is also about responding to                 
concerns related to “health, welfare, and security of individuals, communities, and nations” (Felder,             
2016, p. 715). Ignoring the fact that decisions made in regard to these elements are also subject to                  
competing value-based ideologies, we would encourage extension of Felder’s statement to recognize            
the nuanced nature of this issue. Analysts are not inexorably bound to their analytical frames but there                 
is a high degree of policy entrenchment derived from ideological stickiness (Valentine, 2010b). Indeed, a               
critical premise of the SBV social constructivist framework is that through discourse, analytical (and              
ideological) frames can be altered. With that said, we also acknowledge theoretical contributions by              
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith who argue that change, when core values are involved, is difficult, if not                
impossible (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).  
However, we take issue with one of Felder’s closing recommendations that “resolving value             
disputes is best left to the philosophers in terms of substance and to political science in terms of process                   
and governance. Policymakers should not ask nor expect energy analysts to do that which is the domain                 
of policymakers” (Felder, 2016, p. 715). First of all, this would suggest that particular subject areas                
belong entirely to particular disciplines or types of researchers. In the name of inclusion and well as                 
interdisciplinary research, we reject such “disciplinary chauvinism”, elitism, and exclusion outright           
(Sovacool et al., 2015). To put it in more colloquial terms, one doesn’t have to be a medical doctor to                    
contemplate death; a prostitute to understand sex; or a soldier to comment critically on war.  
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Second, value disputes cannot be resolved in the same conclusive manner as a disagreement              
over how many homeruns Mickey Mantle hit in 1961. Value disputes reflect competing realities. The               
misperception that value disputes are resolvable highlights Felder’s ideological perspective, which is            
based on a positivist belief that there must be one answer that is logically best. This is not true in a                     
world of over 7 billion people, all of whom possess different perspectives on what ​logic should guide the                  
pursuit of ​best​. The current political situation in the United States over post-truth politics and President                
Trump only strengthens this argument.  
Thirdly, as we have demonstrated, the implied belief that “analysts” can actually provide some              
form of definitive quantitative judgment that is devoid of subjective interpretation or value-based             
assumptions is inherently misguided. In this paper and in our book, we provided numerous examples to                
illustrate this flawed notion.  
Fourthly, the implied notion that policymakers are philosophical sages who sit atop bastions of              
power undertaking the sole task of melding “empirically objective” scientific and economic analysis into              
philosophical analyses intended to optimize human welfare is false. This view reflects, in our opinion,               
naïve understanding of policymaking and the impact that power and special interests have on agenda               
setting, policy design and policy implementation (Howlett et al., 2009). 
5.0 Towards Better Informed, More Democratic Energy Policymaking  
The SBV social constructivist framework that is detailed in ​Fact and Fiction in Global Energy               
Policy is likely a difficult pill to swallow for those who embrace the positivist notion that there is one                   
optimal truth, one best policy prescription, one superior technology, or one ideal approach to energy               
research. Ironically, such a mindset is precisely what leads to dialogues of the deaf. Individuals or groups                 
become so deeply committed to defending the verity of their perspective that they shut themselves off                
from emerging science that might otherwise alter their analysis. They become so embedded in their               
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preferred paths that they begin to overlook emergent risks. In an effort to seek validation of their                 
conclusions, they don conceptual blinders – frequenting only the media sources that they know will               
confirm their desires or beliefs, aligning themselves with groups of like-minded individuals and ignoring              
information which might give them cause to question held beliefs. There is a wealth of evidence from                 
the psychological literature on confirmation bias (Kunda, 1999; Nickerson, 1998), group polarization            
(Isenberg, 1986; Myers and Lamm, 1976) and motivated reasoning (Boiney et al., 1997; Kunda, 1990)               
that serves as testament to the omnipresence of this phenomenon. Due to these ideological fetters,               
biased analysts no longer view energy policy as a process designed to deliver a service to the masses.                  
They see energy policy as a proxy for advocacy of preferred technologies. In short, the method becomes                 
both medium and message. 
If Felder would have bothered to fully read ​Fact and Fiction in Global Energy Policy​, he would                 
have encountered an important feature of our analysis. We contend that our six maxims are put forward                 
as a framework for helping people to better understand their worldviews, the worldviews of others and                
the impact that competing worldviews can have on energy policymaking. We do not contend that the six                 
maxims are panacea for contention, but instead a more sophisticated lens by which to view controversy.                
They can help to “improve analytical skills in energy governance and decision-making” (Sovacool et al.,               
2016, p. 345). We further note that these maxims have a universal quality. Specifically, we note “for                 
readers who are members of the general public, this will make you better citizens; for policymakers, this                 
will make you better practitioners” (Sovacool et al., 2016, p. 346). Table 3 provides an update from the                  
book which restates the six maxims in a more personalized way in order to better convey why they may                   
attenuate some of the conditions that can precipitate polarized disagreement and policy paralysis. 
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Table 3: Six Maxims of a Social Constructivist Framework for Energy Problems 
 Maxim 
1 Know the players – to reveal competing interests, understand where the power lies and how it                
manifests itself in energy decisions; 
2 Inform yourselves – to counter rapidity of change, keep up to date and educate yourself about                
energy technologies and issues; 
3 Be prudent about risk – to manage risk and uncertainty, attempt to make energy decisions that are                 
based on clear ethical principles and well-informed by science; 
4 Seek diversity and inclusivity – to avoid undemocratic exclusion and opposition by special interest              
groups, remember that energy decisions must meet the needs of a broad spectrum of citizens and                
stakeholders; 
5 Practice self-reflection – to understand underlying ideologies, strive to become aware of your own              
ideological frames that might prohibit a balanced analysis; 
6 Embrace technological agnosticism – to avoid energy evangelism, look beyond a given energy             
technology to the services it provides and recognize that many systems can deliver the same               
solution. 
Source: Modified from Sovacool et al. 2016 
 
This framework of maxims should not be misconstrued to suggest that extreme contention and              
polarized disagreement can be completely mitigated by applying the six maxims. Knowing the players              
and their vested interests will not stop powerful groups from deterring or derailing change, but it will                 
help stakeholders to understand why elevated contention exists. Keeping oneself informed and            
up-to-date about energy technologies and issues will not guarantee interpretive consensus, but it will              
help to ensure that contention is not fueled by outmoded scientific understanding. Perceptions of risk               
will not be unified through explication of competing assumptions, but at least the basis for contention                
will be clarified. Seeking diversity and inclusivity might actually exacerbate conflicts by introducing new              
competing worldviews, but the process will at least resonate with the democratic right to be heard.                
Moreover, as management scholars well know, diversity and inclusivity, if managed effectively yield far              
more innovative solutions then silo thinking does (Whetton and Cameron, 2007). Practicing            
self-reflection does not ensure that a person can therefore objectively assess energy issues, but it at                
least sires an understanding that one’s perspective might not be the only perspective. Finally, invoking               
the will to embrace technological agnosticism will not always result in unbiased analysis, but it will draw                 
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one’s attention to the constraints created by entrenched technological bias and help humanize energy              
choices by focusing on the services technologies are there to provide.  
Felder’s critique of the SBV social constructivist framework highlights how pronounced the            
hurdles are in trying to encourage shared discourse amongst individuals who possess strongly held              
ideological beliefs. Our maxims are not prescriptive, as Felder implies, nor exhaustive; nor can it be said                 
that putting forth a list of maxims constitutes an act which “undercuts the very common ground” that                 
we believe is useful for encouraging more inclusive, better informed energy planning. 
It is our belief that the six maxims represent the foundation for conscious efforts that can be                 
made to try and participate in energy policy discourse in a manner that is grounded in the humble                  
acknowledgement that each person sees the world differently - beauty truly lies in the eyes of the                 
beholder. These maxims are normative suggestions to help people find common ground by recognizing              
some of their own biases and then moving energy planning beyond the trenches of special interests.                
This is especially salient in light of the influential role that energy decisions play in regard to poverty                  
alleviation, global health and environmental change.  
Furthermore, a constructivist approach to wicked energy problems reminds us that they            
represent ‘unstructured problems’ (Hoppe 2010) with many uncertainties (about price/performance          
characteristics of individual technologies, consumer demand, social acceptance, long-term regulations)          
and fundamental disagreements and even resistance from vested interests (Verbong and Geels 2010;             
Geels 2004). This means energy sustainability problems have specificities that pose challenges for             
policymakers (Weber and Rohracher 2012) but also researchers themselves: such problems defy simple             
research designs centering on dependent and independent variables, or covering laws. Instead, a             
constructivist approach demands a comprehension of not only combinations of multiple causal            
mechanisms but also conjunctions between event chains, or what Ragin (2008) calls ‘configurational             
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explanation.’ This means that top-down rationalist methods, which may work well for structured             
problems, need to be complemented with other approaches, especially those emphasizing           
“second-best” policy mechanisms (Bennear and Stavins 2007) or “clumsy solutions” (Verweij and            
Thompson 2006). 
Ultimately, it seems to be misguided arguing over the attractiveness of picture frames that hold               
priceless works of art – the frame is not the object that should take center stage, the art is. In a world                      
when energy systems play such an influential role in exacerbating climate change or contributing to               
human insecurity, one would think the preferable goal would be to work toward establishing a discourse                
that would address this exigent problem. There are many paths that lead to a resolution and this                 
suggests that there are compromise strategies that can be negotiated. Indeed, this is what ​Fact and                
Fiction in Global Energy Policy ​is all about – facilitating a discussion that does not fall on deaf ears. The                    
SBV framework is therefore based on encouraging praxis over paralysis, inclusion over ignorance, and              
balance over bias. 
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